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ONLY PRESUMED UNRELIABLE: PROVING CONFRONTATION
FORFEITURE WITH HEARSAY
TIMDONALDSON*

A criminal defendant may forfeit the right to confront a prosecution
witness at trial if the defendant has purposefully prevented the witness from
testifying. This doctrine was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
2
1878 but remained largely undeveloped until the 1970s. After its use for many
years by lower federal courts, the Supreme Court added a hearsay exception to the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1997 that admits into evidence "[a] statement offered
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to,
and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness."3 The rule
"codifies the forfeiture doctrine . . . .'
The Supreme Court reconfirmed its acceptance of the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine in Crawfordv. Washington without significant discussion.' It
has officially taken "no position on the standards necessary to demonstrate such
forfeiture .... " 6 However, the Court commented in Davis v. Washington that state
courts have considered "hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witness's outof-court statements" when making forfeiture determinations.7 The Colorado
Supreme Court succinctly explained the rationale relied upon by state courts in
Vasquez v. People.8 The Vasquez court reasoned that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine presents a preliminary question as to the admissibility of evidence;
therefore, under regular evidentiary procedures, "the determination shall not be
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. Thus,
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1. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359-68 (2008); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158
(1878).
2. See generally Tim Donaldson, Combating Victim/Witness Intimidation in Family Violence
Cases: A Response to Critics of the "Forfeitureby Wrongdoing" Confrontation Exception Resurrected
by the Supreme Court in Crawford and Davis, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 643, 653-61 (2008) (tracing the
development of the doctrine in the United States).

3.
R. EVID.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Order Amending the FED. R. EVID., 520 U.S. 1323, 1328 (1997) (codified as amended at FED.
804(b)(6)).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006); see also Giles, 554 U.S. at 367.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
Id (quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 174 (Mass. 2005)).
Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2007).
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hearsay evidence, including the unavailable witness's out-of-court statements, will
be admissible."
Many courts have ruled that hearsay may be used to prove forfeiture-bywrongdoing.
A federal district court observed that "successful witness
intimidation would often not be provable at all if hearsay were not permitted.""
Some courts have nonetheless held that forfeiture-by-wrongdoing may not be
proven solely by inadmissible evidence. 12 The Supreme Court of Utah wrote in
State v. Poole that the right of confrontation is a significant constitutional
protection that should not be easily forfeited.13 Courts in that state therefore "may
not consider hearsay evidence in evaluating the admission of out-of-court
statements on the basis of forfeiture by wrongdoing."14
This article examines whether hearsay may be relied upon for purposes of
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine to prove that a criminal defendant tampered
with a witness.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE ALLOWING RELIANCE ON HEARSAY

Two of the early circuit court decisions resurrecting the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine commented, with apparent approval, that the trial courts in
those cases had relied upon hearsay evidence to determine the admissibility of
statements made by unavailable witnesses. By the time those cases were decided,
Federal Rule of Evidence 104 ("Rule 104") had been adopted stating that trial
judges are "not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
9. Id at 1105.
10. See, e.g., United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("We thus join all the
other courts to have addressed the matter in approving at least partial reliance on hearsay."); Jenkins v.
United States, 80 A.3d 978, 996 n.47 (D.C. 2013) (citing cases); State v. Pickens, 25 N.E.3d 1023, 1058
(Ohio 2014) (same); see also People v. Perkins, 691 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274-75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (listing
multiple New York and federal cases that allow use of hearsay to make forfeiture determinations).
11. Geraci v. Senkowski, 23 F. Supp. 2d 246, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd 211 F.3d 6 (2d Cir.
2000).
12. California has held that the prosecution cannot rely solely upon an out-of-court statement
made by a missing witness to prove forfeiture and must also "present independent corroborative
evidence supporting the forfeiture finding. The prosecution also must show the unavailable witness's
prior statement falls within a recognized hearsay exception and the probative value of the proffered
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." People v. Osorio, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 173 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008); see also People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 446 (Cal. 2007), vacated on other grounds by Giles v.
California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). Kentucky also appears to require at least some admissible evidence to
support a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing finding. Hammond v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 425, 432-33
(Ky. 2012).
13. State v. Poole, 232 P.3d 519, 527 (Utah 2010).
14. Id at 526.
15. United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979) (recounting testimony given by an
FBI agent about what the agent had been told by a witness regarding his reasons for not wanting to
testify), abrogated on other grounds by Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1984), as
recognized in United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that the trial court heard testimony from DEA agents who
relayed hearsay statements made by a witness about why he refused to testify).
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privileges" when making preliminary determinations concerning the admissibility
of evidence.16 The Advisory Committee notes on Rule 104 assert that sound sense
supported suspension of the exclusionary law of evidence in such situations, "and
that the judge should be empowered to hear any relevant evidence, such as
affidavits or other reliable hearsay." 1 7 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine in United States v. Mastrangelo,
because "[a]ny other result would mock the very system of justice the
confrontation clause was designed to protect."" The Mastrangelo court also
expressly confirmed that a defendant's possible waiver of his sixth amendment
rights is a preliminary question going to the admissibility of evidence "governed
by [Rule] 104(a), which states that the exclusionary rules, excepting privileges, do
not apply to such proceedings."19
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) ("Rule 804(b)(6)") regarding
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing was adopted in early 1997.20 The Advisory Committee
note for the rule cites reasoning from Mastrangelo regarding the purpose behind
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine as justification for the rule. 2 1 The Advisory
Committee note does not expressly address the use of hearsay when making
forfeiture determinations, but it does imply that Rule 104 generally applies by
stating that the "usual Rule 104(a) preponderance of the evidence standard has
been adopted in light of the behavior the new Rule 804(b)(6) seeks to
discourage." 2 2 Shortly after adoption of Rule 804(b)(6), the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. White explained the
rationale for use of Rule 104(a) in the context of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, writing
that:
Because a judge, unlike a jury, can bring considerable experience and
knowledge to bear on the issue of how much weight to give to the
evidence, and because preliminary determinations must be made

16. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1930 (establishing rules of evidence for
certain courts and proceedings) (codified as amended at FED. R. EVID. 104(a)); see also FED. R. EVID.
110 1(d)(1).
17. WARREN BURGER, COMMUNICATION FROM CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.

No. 93-46, at 48 (1973) [hereinafter H.R. Doc. No. 93-46]; see also Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 188 (1969).
18. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982).
19. Id.; see also Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202-03 (6th Cir. 1982) (commenting with
citation to Rule 104(a) that a trial judge is not bound by the rules of evidence when making such
determinations); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 968 n.9 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (quoting
Rule 104(a) and noting that "[i]n making a preliminary determination, the trial court has at its disposal
all the information in the record, except privileged information."); United States v. Houlihan, 887 F.
Supp. 352, 357 (D. Mass. 1995) (writing that "[p]ursuant to FED.R.EVID. 104(a), this Court was not
bound by the rules of evidence in making its determination.").
20. Order Amending the FED. R. EVID., 520 U.S. 1323, 1328 (1997).
21. WILLIAM REHNQUIST, COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 105-69, 22 (1997) [hereinafter H.R. Doc. No. 105-69].
22. Id. at 23.
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speedily, without unnecessary duplication of what is to occur at trial, it
is within the judge's discretion to admit hearsay evidence that has at
23
least some degree of reliability.

The codification of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine by Rule
804(b)(6) therefore bolstered the application of Rule 104 to forfeiture
determinations. However, the suspension of normal evidentiary rules when making
preliminary determinations on evidence admissibility was not universally endorsed
before adoption of Rule 104. The Advisory Committee notes recognize that the
authorities on the subject were "scattered and inconclusive." 24 One of the leading
pre-rule cases was Glasser v. United States.25 The Supreme Court held in Glasser
that declarations made by an alleged co-conspirator in the absence of the person
against whom they are offered would be admissible only if there was "proof
aliunde" that such person was connected with the conspiracy.2 6 The Glasser Court
expressed concern that "[o]therwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps
to the level of competent evidence." 27 This proof aliunde condition required
substantial independent evidence of predicate facts establishing admissibility.2 8
Most of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal initially held that Glasser's
proof aliunde requirement survived adoption of Rule 104.29 The Supreme Court
ultimately held otherwise in Bourjaily v. United States.3 0 The Court explained in
Bourjaily that "[t]he Rule on its face allows the trial judge to consider any
evidence whatsoever, bound only by the rules of privilege." 31 Noting that the rule
is sufficiently clear, the Court held that it prevails over Glasser.3 2 The Court wrote
that "[t]o the extent that Glasser meant that courts could not look to hearsay
statements themselves for any purpose, it has clearly been superseded by Rule

23. United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
24. H.R. Doc. No. 93-46, supra note 17, at 48 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 53, at 123-24 n.8 (1954)); see also Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of
Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 188 (1969).
25. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), superseded by statute, FED. R. EVID. 104(a), as
recognized in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987).
26. Id at 74.
27. Id. at 75. Glasser dealt with the co-conspirator statement rule, however, concerns about
bootstrapping have not been limited to that hearsay exception. See, e.g., State v. Young, 161 P.3d 967,
976 ¶34 (Wash. 2007) (requiring some independent corroborative evidence that a startling event
occurred to admit an excited utterance); State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231, 234-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
(same); Truck Ins. Exchange v. Michling, 364 S.W.2d 172, 174-75 (Tex. 1963) (same).
28. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1974).
29. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 246 n.3 (3rd Cir. 1983); see also United States v.
Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 696-97 (5th Cir. 1978); but see United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th
Cir. 1979) (adopting view that Rule 104(a) modified prior law to the contrary); United States v.
Martorano, 561 F.2d 406, 408-09 (1st Cir. 1977) (questioning the continued vitality of Glasser).
30. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), superseded by statute, FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2), as recognizedin Wiest v. Lynch, 15 F.Supp.3d 543, 563 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
31. Id. at 178.
32. Id at 178-79.
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104(a)."3 3 The Court therefore held that a trial court "may examine the hearsay
statements sought to be admitted" to make admissibility determinations under the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.3 4
Cases allowing consideration of hearsay evidence when making
determinations under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine have relied on many
rationales, but all are somehow rooted in relaxation of proof requirements by rule
when making preliminary judicial determinations regarding evidence admissibility.
Many have expressly relied on state evidence rules similar to Rule 104. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia made analogy to the process
endorsed by Bourjaily for making admissibility determinations under the coconspirator statement rule. 36 The Massachusetts state court decision, cited by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. Washington as an example of state practices,
reasoned, along with citation to Mastrangelo, that a forfeiture hearing "is not
intended to be a mini-trial, and accordingly, hearsay evidence, including the
unavailable witness's out-of-court statements, may be considered."3 7 The Illinois
Supreme Court agreed that hearsay evidence could be considered when making
forfeiture determinations, because the U.S. Supreme Court had referenced such
state practices in Davis with apparent approval. 38 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio ruled with citation to Davis that hearsay may be
relied upon at a preliminary evidentiary hearing to make the showing required for
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing. 39 All link back to Rule 104 in some way.
II.

LINGERING CONCERNS ABOUT RELIANCE ON HEARSAY

The Utah
rules of evidence,
evidence" should
application of the

Supreme Court expressed concern in State v. Poole that "the
including the rules controlling the admission of hearsay
apply when making forfeiture determinations, because
doctrine deprives a criminal defendant of the significant

33. Id. at 181.
34. Id
35. Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Colo. 2007); State v. Magouirk, 561 So.2d 801, 80506 (La. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1346-47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984);
People v. Sweeper, 471 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487-88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); State v. Pickens, 25 N.E.3d 1023,
1058 ¶ 171 (Ohio 2014).
36. Jenkins v. United States, 80 A.3d 978, 996 (D.C. 2013). The Bourjaily holding was, in turn,
based on Rule 104. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 178-81 (1987).
37. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 174 (Mass. 2005); quoted in Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). The Mastrangelo holding was, in turn, based on Rule 104.
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273. Other courts have also based their reasoning on Mastrangelo. See, e.g.,
People v. Banks, 551 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1012 n.* (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); La Torres v. Walker, 216 F. Supp.
2d 157, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
38. People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 353 (Ill. 2007); see also Ware v. Harry, 636 F. Supp. 2d
575, 586 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2008). The state practices mentioned by the Supreme Court in Davis were
justified by Mastrangelowhich was based on Rule 104. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (quoting Edwards, 830
N.E.2d at 174 (citing Mastrangelo,693 F.2d at 273 (citing Rule 104))).
39. United States v. Ledbetter, 141 F. Supp.3d 786, 790 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (citing Davis, 547 U.S.
at 833 (quoting Edwards, 830 N.E.2d at 174 (citing Mastrangelo,693 F.2d at 273 (citing Rule 104)))).
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constitutional protection provided by confrontation. 40 The Poole court
acknowledged that Utah's rules of evidence generally did not by their terms apply
to preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of evidence. 41 The court
explained, however, that this rule was not absolute, and it could still direct a trial
court "to conduct its analysis within the confines of the Utah Rules of Evidence."42
The court therefore reasoned that "[t]he question then is not the existence of the
power to disregard the Rules, but rather when that power should be exercised." 43
Due to the importance of the right of confrontation, the Poole court concluded that
"[t]his is one of those instances that demands that we disregard 104(a)'s general
rule." 44 Forfeiture may therefore be proven in Utah only "through evidence
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence." 45
Some other jurisdictions have expressed the same concern raised in Poole
that the right of confrontation should not be easily forfeited, but have addressed the
concern differently. 46 For example, the Washington Supreme Court wrote in State
v. Mason that forfeiture-by-wrongdoing could only be proven in Washington by
clear-and-convincing evidence, because "the right of confrontation should not be
easily deemed forfeited by an accused." 47 Despite sharing this concern, the Poole
court rejected the clear-and-convincing evidence standard adopted by Washington
in Mason and instead addressed it by limiting the type of evidence that may be
used in Utah to prove forfeiture-by-wrongdoing under a preponderance of the
evidence proof standard.48
It seems unlikely absent an abandonment of existing precedent that the
U.S. Supreme Court would find that the importance of a right, standing alone,
completely bars consideration of hearsay evidence when determining if the right
has been lost. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Matlock that a trial court
could rely on hearsay during a suppression hearing to determine if a search was
40. 232 P.3d 519, 527 (Utah 2010).
41. Id at 526-27.
42. Id at 527.
43. Id (quoting State v. Ordonez-Villanueva, 908 P.2d 333, 338 n.9 (Or. App. Ct. 1995)).
44. Poole, 232 P.3d at 527.
45. Id. Federal courts in Utah appear to allow at least partial reliance on hearsay. Trentadue v.
C.I.A., 95 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 308, 310 (D. Utah 2014).
46. See generally Tim Donaldson, Keeping the Balance True: Proof Requirements for
Confrontation Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, 31 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 429, 432-36 (2014) (reviewing
jurisdictions that have adopted a clear-and-convincing evidence standard of proof for forfeiture
determinations and their reasons for doing so).
47. State v. Mason, 162 P.3d 396, 404-05, ¶ 30 (Wash. 2007); see also United States v. Thevis,
665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[B]ecause confrontation rights are so integral to the accuracy of the
fact-finding process and the search for truth, in contrast to the exclusionary rule, we conclude that the
trial court was correct in requiring clear and convincing evidence of a waiver of this right."),
superseded by rule, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v. Nelson, 242 Fed. Appx.
164, 171 (5th Cir. 2007); People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 822 (N.Y. 1995) (adopting a clear-andconvincing evidence standard, writing: "Obviously, a defendant's loss of the valued Sixth Amendment
confrontation right constitutes a substantial deprivation.").

48. State v. Poole, 232 P.3d 519, 525-27,
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consensual, and a defendant had thereby lost his Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures to have evidence from the search excluded at
trial. 49 The Court recognized in Matlock that it had distinguished between the rules
governing trials and those applicable to whether evidence was admissible at trial.o
The Court noted that Rule 104(a) had recently been proposed and transmitted to
Congress. It further asserted that "[t]he Rules in this respect reflect the general
views of various authorities on evidence." 52 The Court went on to explain that:

There is, therefore, much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings
where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence, the
exclusionary rules, aside from rules of privilege, should not be applicable; and the
judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and
experience counsel. However that may be, certainly there should be no automatic
rule against the reception of hearsay evidence in such proceedings . . ..
The U.S. Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Bourjaily v.
United States. 54 The Bourjaily Court reasoned that hearsay is not completely
devoid of value. "[O]ut-of-court statements are only presumed unreliable. The

presumption may be rebutted by appropriate proof." 5 5 Therefore, trial courts
should be allowed to evaluate the evidentiary worth of out-of-court statements as
revealed by the particular circumstances in a given case.56 The Court recognized
that:
Courts often act as factfinders, and there is no reason to believe that
courts are any less able to properly recognize the probative value of
evidence in this particular area. The party opposing admission has an
adequate incentive to point out the shortcomings in such evidence
before the trial court finds the preliminary facts. If the opposing party is
unsuccessful in keeping the evidence from the factfinder, he still has the
opportunity to attack the probative value of the evidence as it relates to
the substantive issue in the case.57
The Bourjaily Court held that evidence was properly admitted at trial utilizing
hearsay in part to determine admissibility and agreed that the requirements for
admission under the co-conspirator statement rule "are identical to the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-77 (1974).
Id at 172-73 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949)).
Id at 173-74.
Id at 174.
Id at 175; see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 679 (1980) ("At a suppression

hearing, the court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be
admissible at trial.").

54.
55.
56.
57.
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admissible under the Rule, there was no constitutional problem."s
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were

III. CONCLUSIVENESS OF RULE 104?
The concerns raised by the Utah Supreme Court in Poole about usage of
hearsay when making evidence admissibility determinations nonetheless merit
consideration.5 9 Rule 104(a) did not codify a universally acclaimed evidentiary
procedure. The relaxation of evidentiary rules was "one of the few radical changes
in the pre-existing law the Advisory Committee succeeded in carrying off." 6 0 Only
New Jersey had previously adopted a similar rule.6 1 "Though scholars had
supported this change for some time, the courts generally held that the rules of
evidence applied to preliminary fact determinations." 6 2 Many jurisdictions had no
common law cases supporting the committee's view and resisted the change.63
The Advisory Committee's rationale for the rule rested primarily upon the
differentiation between the roles of judges and jurors with respect to evidentiary
matters coupled with practical necessity. Advisory Committee notes rely upon
McCormick on Evidence to explain with respect to the process for making
admissibility determinations:
The rule provides that the rules of evidence in general do not apply to
this process. McCormick § 53, p. 123, n. 8, points out that the
authorities are "scattered and inconclusive," and observes:
"Should the exclusionary law of evidence, 'the child of the jury
system' in Thayer's phrase, be applied to this hearing before the judge?
Sound sense backs the view that it should not and that the judge should
be empowered to hear any relevant evidence, such as affidavits or other
reliable hearsay."
This view is reinforced by practical necessity in certain situations.
An item, offered and objected to, may itself be considered in ruling on
admissibility, though not yet admitted in evidence.64

58. Id. at 182. It should however be noted that it could now be argued that confrontation rights

were not actually at stake in Bourjaily. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 374-75 n.6 (2008)
(plurality opinion).
59. See State v. Poole, 232 P.3d 519, 526-27, ¶ 26 (Utah 2010).
60. 21A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

§ 5055,

at 163 (2d. ed. 2005).
61. State v. Cardone, 368 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); see also H.R. Doc. No.

93-46, supra note 17, at 49 (discussing development of state rules in California and New Jersey);
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates,

46 F.R.D. 161, 189 (1969) (same).
62. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supranote 60, at 163 (footnote omitted).

63. Id. at 164-65; e.g., State v. Davis, 227 S.E.2d 97, 115-16 (N.C. 1976).
64. H.R. Doc. No. 93-46, supra note 17, at 48 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 53, at 123-24 n.8 (1954)); see also Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of
Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 188 (1969).
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The passage from McCormick on Evidence quoted by the Committee goes on to
say that "Wigmore states this as the law without citing supporting authority."65
The reasoning of McCormick and the Advisory Committee is derived
from a famous passage in A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence where Professor
James Thayer concluded that evidentiary rules which reject probative evidence on
one or another practical ground are "the child of the jury system." 6 6 In Thayer's
view, all logically probative evidence should be admissible unless excluded by
some rule or principle of law. 67 He asserted that exclusionary rules are an offshoot
of the development of the modem jury trial.6 8 According to Thayer, it must be
constantly kept in mind that the law of evidence is the product of "judicial
oversight and control of the process of introducing evidence to the jury .... ."69
They provide a mechanism to prevent jurors from considering information that
might be "misused or overestimated by that body . . . ."70
Thayer's view was shared by the other preeminent scholar of his time on
the subject of evidence.7 1 Professor John Henry Wigmore agreed that "[a]ll facts
having rational probative value are admissible unless some specific rule
forbids."7 2 He reasoned that evidentiary rules could be ignored in interlocutory
proceedings heard before a judge "partly because of the subsidiary and provisional
nature of the inquiry, but chiefly because there is no jury, and the rules of evidence
are, as rules, traditionally associated with a trial by jury."7 3 Wigmore also asserted
that "[i]n preliminary rulings by a judge on the admissibility of evidence, the
ordinary rules of evidence do not apply." 74
Wigmore's proposition that the rules of evidence do not apply to
admissibility determinations was extensively examined in a well-researched article
by Professor John Maguire and Mr. Charles Epstein.7 5 They found some historical
common law support for the view that evidentiary rules apply only when

65. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§

53, at 124 n.8 (1954).

The Advisory Committee incompletely attributes to McCormick the view that authorities on the subject
were "scattered and inconclusive." McCormick more fully wrote that "American authorities are
scattered and inconclusive but suggest that the judges trial and appellate give primacy here to habit
rather than to practical adaptation to the situation, and tend to require the observance of jury-trial rules
of evidence." Id.
66. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW

266 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1898).
67. Id. at 265.
68. Id. at 180.
69. Id. at 181.
70. Id. at 266.
71. See JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN

SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN

TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 9, at 31-32, § 10, at 34-35 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Company 1904)
(quoting Thayer).
72. Id. § 10, at 34.
73. Id. § 4, at 14
74. Id. § 1385(2), at 1726.
75. John MacArthur Maguire & Charles S. S. Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary
Controversies as to Admissibility, 36 YALE L.J. 1101 (1927).
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presenting information to a jury, but they also found other authorities that could be
read as requiring use of regular evidence when making certain types of
admissibility determinations.76 They also concluded that more recent English
decisions "lend little support to the decided statement by Wigmore . ...
Maguire and Epstein similarly found that American decisions were few and mixed.
Some supported Wigmore's proposition, but many required proof of preliminary
facts by admissible evidence.78 On the basis of their research, the authors indicated
"skepticism as to the judge's exemption from most rules of evidence." 7 9 They
ultimately determined however that the results from their examination of
Wigmore's hypothesis were inconclusive. Maguire and Epstein concluded: "On the
whole, then, it is perhaps wisest to think of the few reported cases as often being
persuasive only, and to admit frankly that in this minor aspect we are unlikely to
find a common law of evidence." 0
Historical sources dealing with the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine do
not directly address the issue, but appear to have allowed consideration of hearsay
for purposes of admissibility determinations. In the earliest appearance of the
doctrine, the judges ruled in Lord Morley's Case that a deposition of an absent
witness could be used during a murder trial in the House of Lords "in case oath
should be made that any witness .. . was detained by the means or procurement of
the prisoner...."8 Maguire and Epstein commented that the reference to an
"oath" in Lord Morley 's Case was ambiguous, and it was therefore not clear what
type of preliminary proof might have been required for admissibility rulings.82 The
tribunal in that case did however consider double hearsay when making a
determination, but it found the proof insufficient to implicate the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine.83

76. Id at 1103-12.
77. Id. at 1111.
78. See id. at 1112-25.
79. Id at 1122.
80. Id at 1125; see also Charles T. McCormick, The Procedure of Admitting and Excluding
Evidence, 31 TEX. L. REV. 128, 144 n.81 (1952).
81. Lord Morley's Case (1666) 84 Eng. Rep. 1079 (HL) 1080 ¶ 5, reprintedin 6 T.B. HOWELL, A
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND

PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER

CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783, at 770, 770-71 para. 5

(London, T.C. Hansard 1816) [hereinafter Lord Morley's Case in HOWELL].
82. Maguire & Epstein, supra note 75, at 1108-09.
83. Lord Morley's Case in HOWELL, supra note 81, at 777 (considering what the employer of a
missing witness was told by friends of the witness). The import of Lord Morley's Case is also
ambiguous, because the judges indicated that the forfeiture determination in that case should be made
by the Lords as the fact finders in a proceeding against one of their peers, as opposed to the judges. Id
at 770-71. Hawkins later indicated in his influential treatise on pleas of the crown that forfeiture
determinations in ordinary criminal cases during his time were made by the court; writing that the
doctrine applied "if it be made out by Oath to the Satisfaction of the Court. . . ." 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS,
A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN OR, A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO
THAT SUBJECT, DIGESTED UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS ch. 46,

§

6, at 429 (Savoy, Eliz. Nutt & R.

Gosling 1721). By the time of the American Constitution was adopted, the roles of the judge and jury
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In another early case, a regular court of law held that prior testimony of a
supposedly tampered witness might be used after "it was shewn to the Court that
he was gone beyond sea . .
84 The report for the case unfortunately does not
otherwise indicate what type of proof was deemed satisfactory by the court. The
same court in another case presumed tampering from circumstantial information,
but the summary for that case does not detail the nature of the proof considered by
the court."
The court in Henry Harrison's Case held that the prosecution could use
depositions given by a missing witness against Harrison if it could "prove upon
him, that he made him keep away."8 6 The court in that case accepted hearsay and
circumstantial evidence as such proof One witness testified that an unnamed
gentleman attempted to bribe the missing witness to give evidence favorable to
Harrison, and that the missing witness further said that the gentleman would have
seized him if he had been given the opportunity.8 7 Another witness testified about
the suspicious circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the missing witness
and was asked by the court if he had been told by the missing witness about the
attempted bribe. This proof was evidently enough to satisfy the court, because it
allowed the prior testimony of the missing witness to be read.8 9
The House of Commons in Fenwick's Case considered hearsay statements
allegedly made by Fenwick's solicitor when attempting to bribe someone to
discredit a missing witness whose prior testimony was offered by the
prosecution.9 0 It likewise considered hearsay reportedly uttered by an accomplice
of the defendant to determine whether the defendant was involved in an effort to
bribe witnesses.9 1 After considerable debate, a divided House voted in favor of

with respect to determining the admissibility of hearsay were fairly well defined. See, e.g., United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 179 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693) (Chief Justice John Marshall
concluding while presiding over a case as a Circuit Judge that "[ilt is of necessity the peculiar province
of the court to judge of the admissibility of testimony."); see also Thomas John's Case (1790),
reprinted in 1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 5, § 124, at 358
(London, A. Strahan 1803).
84. The Case of Thatcher and Waller (1676), 84 Eng. Rep. 1143 (K.B.), T. Jones 53.
85. FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NIsI PRIUS, 243

(New York, Southwick & Hardcastle 1806) (summarizing a King's Bench case entitled Green v.
Gatewick).
86. 12 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783,

at 834, 851 (London, T.C. Hansard 1816) [hereinafter Henry Harrison's Case in HOWELL].
87. Id.
88. Id. at 851-52.
89. Id. at 852-53.
90.

13 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH

TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1783,

at 538, at 590-91 (London, T.C. Hansard 1816).
91. Id. at 588-89.
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admitting prior testimony given by the missing witness.9 2 The value of Fenwick's
Case regarding the type of proof needed to establish forfeiture is highly
questionable, however, because much of the debate concerned whether the House
of Commons was bound in that attainder proceeding by any of the rules regularly
applicable in court.9 3
The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine was codified by Parliament in a
1796 statute passed to deal with insurrections in Ireland. 9 4 A later statute regulating
grand jury practice indicated that forfeiture could only be proven by "witnesses
sworn, or other lawful Evidence ....
However, the statutes provide little
guidance because they did not deal with how such issues could be decided by a
judge. The statutes codifying the doctrine for Ireland all required and dealt only
with forfeiture determinations made by juries.96
An early American case confirms recognition of a forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine in this country, but it does not describe the nature of the proof
used to support the court's forfeiture determination. 97 The doctrine is mentioned in
passing by another early decision, but it wasn't pertinent to the holding in that case
and is not further discussed. 98 Constitution signer Charles Pinckney wrote in a
letter criticizing a 1799 extradition decision that certain statutorily authorized pretrial examinations could "only be given in evidence before a jury, when the court is
satisfied the witness is dead, unable to travel, or kept away by the means or
procurements of the prisoner." He did not, however, further indicate what type of
proof was needed to satisfy a court. 99

92. Id. at 607 (voting 218-145 in favor of allowing the preliminary examination of the missing
witness to be read), 622 (voting 180-102 to allow use of testimony given by the missing witness at an
earlier trial).
93. Id. at 597-98 (speech by Sir Edw. Seymour), 599 (speech of Sir Robert Richard), 600 (speech
of Lord Cutts) 603-04 (speech of Sir Joseph Williamson), 604-05 (speech of Mr. Chanc. of the
Exchequer), 605-06 (speech of Sir Henry Hobart).
94. An act more effectually to suppress insurrections, and prevent the disturbances of the public
peace, 1796, 36 Geo. 3, c. 20, § 12 (Ir.), reprinted in THE STATUTES AT LARGE, PASSED IN THE
PARLIAMENTS HELD IN IRELAND: FROM THE THIRD YEAR OF EDWARD THE SECOND, A.D. 1310, TO THE

THIRTY-SIXTH YEAR OF GEORGE THE THIRD, A.D. 1796, INCLUSIVE, at 982 (Dublin, George Grierson
1797). A similar statute was subsequently enacted in 1810. See An act for the more effectually
preventing the administering and taking of unlawful oaths in Ireland; and for the protection of
magistrates and witnesses in criminal cases, 1810, 50 Geo. 3, 102, § 5 (Eng.).
95. An act to regulate proceedings of grand juries in Ireland, upon bills of indictment, 1816, 56
Geo. 3, 87, § 3 (Eng.).
96. See An act to regulate proceedings of grand juries in Ireland, upon bills of indictment, 1816,
56 Geo. 3, 87, § 3 (Eng.) (providing a method for proving forfeiture to a grand jury); An act for the
more effectually preventing the administering and taking of unlawful oaths in Ireland; and for the
protection of magistrates and witnesses in criminal cases, 1810, 50 Geo. 3, 102, § 5 (Eng.) (making
forfeiture a collateral issue to be put to a jury); An act more effectually to suppress insurrections, and
prevent the disturbances of the public peace, 1796, 36 Geo. 3, c. 20, § 13 (Ir.) (same).
97. Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775).
98. Drayton v. Wells, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott. & McC.) 409, 411-12 (S.C. 1819).
99. United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 838 (D. S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175) (reprinting an Aug.
3, 1799 letter attributed to South Carolina Senator Charles Pinckney).
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The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine
in Reynolds v. United States.100 The Court found that there was sufficient
information to apply the doctrine in Reynolds where the defendant did not deny
interference and was uncooperative with prosecution attempts to secure the
attendance of the witness at trial. 101 The Reynolds Court did not expressly address
whether the trial court had relied or could rely on otherwise inadmissible evidence,
but it did generally indicate that a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing determination would
be subject to only very limited appellate review, writing:
Such being the rule, the question becomes practically one of fact, to be
settled as a preliminary to the admission of secondary evidence. In this
respect it is like the preliminary question of the proof of loss of a written
instrument, before secondary evidence of the contents of the instrument
can be admitted. In Lord Morley 's Case (supra), it would seem to have
been considered a question for the trial court alone, and not subject to
review on error or appeal; but without deeming it necessary in this case
to go so far as that, we have no hesitation in saying that the finding of
the court below is, at least, to have the effect of a verdict of a jury upon
a question of fact, and should not be disturbed unless the error is
manifest.

102

Although not too much should be read into the Reynolds Court's above quoted
comparison of the method for making forfeiture determinations to the process used
for evidentiary rulings regarding loss of a written instrument, the Supreme Court
had previously held in Tayloe v. Riggs that those preliminary determinations could
be made on the basis of affidavits containing evidence that would normally be
inadmissible.10 3 In that situation, the Supreme Court had written that "we think the
views of justice will be best promoted by allowing the affidavit, not as conclusive
evidence, but as submitted to the consideration of the Court, to be weighed with
the other circumstances of the case."10 4
The early application of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine therefore
supports Wigmore's hypothesis. Most of the cases, and in particular those reported
in detail,
demonstrate reliance on hearsay when making forfeiture
determinations. 105 The Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds additionally implies,
when it is read in conjunction with the court's earlier decision in Tayloe, that
normally inadmissible evidence may be used by a judge when deciding the

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878).
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 159.
Tayloe v. Riggs, 26 U.S. 591, 596-98 (1828).
Id. at 598.

105. See, e.g., Henry Harrison's Case in HOWELL, supranote 86, at 851-52.
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preliminary question of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing.10 None, however, contain a
direct holding on the issue, and are therefore inconclusive.
As recognized by Maguire and Epstein, "[p]oints of evidence in this field
of preliminary controversy arise abruptly and are handled summarily."1 0 7 This is
particularly true with respect to witness tampering. There are many recognized
methods by which a trial judge may consider a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing question
ranging from a preliminary hearing to conditional admission based upon
proffers.1 08 Misconduct, however, cannot be reasonably predicted, and questions
regarding disappearance of a witness often arise mid-trial without warning and
must, by necessity, be dealt with in a manner that minimizes disruption to the trial
that is in progress. A separate mid-trial mini trial is clearly undesirable.1 09 A judge
caught in such a situation should therefore have the flexibility when making an
admissibility determination to "receive the evidence and give it such weight as his
judgment and experience counsel."11 0
Rule 104(a) is based more on sound sense than it is on clear precedent."
As a practical matter, it is impossible for a judge to completely shield himself or
herself from considering inadmissible evidence when determining admissibility.
As the Advisory Committee that recommended Rule 104 pointed out, "the content
of an asserted declaration against interest must be considered in ruling whether it is
against interest."1 12 A trial judge must similarly consider the content of an excited
utterance to determine whether it is a "statement relating to a startling event or
condition. . . ."113 A forfeiture-by-wrongdoing claim based on spontaneous
statements made by a scared missing witness that he or she had been threatened
would therefore present a formalistic nightmare if rigid adherence to the rules of
evidence was required. A trial judge would have to listen to the content of the
hearsay to first decide whether it qualified as an excited utterance and could be
considered legal proof for purposes of determining forfeiture, and then proceed to
strike it entirely from his or her mind if it did not qualify. There is no reason to
believe that this solution, which depends upon the presumed ability of a judge to
compartmentalize information, is any better than simply recognizing that judges

106. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878); Tayloe, 26 U.S. at 598.
107. Maguire & Epstein, supra note 75, at 1125.
108. See Tim Donaldson, A Reliable and Clear-Cut Determination: Is a Separate Hearing
Required to Decide When Confrontation Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Applies? 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 167,
169-76 (2015) (discussing the various procedural alternatives available to resolve forfeiture-bywrongdoing questions).
109. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (commenting that
admissibility determinations need to be made speedily and without unnecessarily duplicating what will
be presented during trial); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 174 (Mass. 2005) (noting that a
forfeiture hearing is not meant to be a mini-trial).
110. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 (1974).
111. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-46, supra note 17, at 48.

112. Id.
113. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
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are able to properly recognize the probative value of purported evidence and weigh
it according to its worth.
Trial judges routinely hear the content of proffered information to
determine whether it is admissible.1 1 4 Hearsay is not automatically accepted as true
simply because it is considered by a judge when considering a preliminary
question of admissibility. A party opposing admission of evidence has an
opportunity to point out its shortcomings before the judge finds the preliminary
facts regarding its admissibility." In addition, judges possess legal training and
experience to guide them regarding its usefulness.1 16 "[A] piece of evidence,
unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when corroborated by other
evidence."1 1 7 Even if a judge admits an out-of-court statement, its mere admission
is not outcome determinative, because the party aggrieved by its submission to a
jury still has the opportunity to attack its probative value as it relates to the
substantive issue in the case."
It has long been recognized that justice is best promoted by allowing
judges the flexibility to consider and weigh all relevant information with other
circumstances in a case when making an admissibility determination.1 1 9 Thus,
there are good reasons to allow a judge to consider hearsay when making an
admissibility determination under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and "no
principled reason to forbid it per se." 12 0

IV.

RESISTANCE TO PURE BOOTSTRAPPING

The Supreme Court in Bourjaily held that Rule 104(a) superseded Glasser
to the extent that Glasser prevented courts from considering hearsay statements
"for any purpose" when determining their admissibility.121 However, the Bourjaily
Court also expressly stated that "[w]e need not decide in this case whether the
courts below could have relied solely upon . .
hearsay statements .... 122it
further cautioned, as it had "held in other cases concerning admissibility

114. See Jenkins v. United States, 80 A.3d 978, 996 n.45 (D.C. 2013) (listing situations where
judges consider the content of a statement to determine whether it is admissible under a hearsay
exception).
115. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180 (1987).
116. See id (commenting that there is no reason to believe that judges are unable to properly
recognize the probative value of evidence); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(recognizing that a judge "can bring considerable experience and knowledge to bear on the issue of how
much weight" to give evidence).
117. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 180.
118. Id.
119. Tayloe v. Riggs, 26 U.S. 591, 598 (1828).
120. Jenkins v. United States, 80 A.3d 978, 996 (D.C. 2013); see also Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 17981; White, 116 F.3d at 914.
121. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181.

122. Id.
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determinations, 'the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as
his judgment and experience counsel.' "123
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States
v. White held, in part based on Bourjaily and Rule 104(a), that a trial court may at
least partially rely on hearsay when making a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
determination. 12 4 Like the Bourjaily Court, it left "for another day the issue of
whether a forfeiture finding could rest solely on hearsay." 125
All of the early United States Circuit Courts of Appeal that considered the
issue reserved in Bourjaily decided that a statement cannot be admitted under the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule based solely upon its own content. 126
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Zambrana found it
significant that Bourjaily acknowledged the presumptive unreliability of
hearsay.127 It wrote that this presumption may dissipate only when the hearsay is
"corroborated by other evidence. . . ."128 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
similarly recognized in United States v. Silverman that, when making admissibility
determinations, trial courts "must bear in mind that out-of-court statements are
presumptively unreliable." 129 The court additionally cautioned that "Rule 104(a)
does not diminish the inherent unreliability of such a statement. Because of this
presumptive unreliability, a co-conspirator's statement implicating the defendant in
the alleged conspiracy must be corroborated by fairly incriminating evidence." 130 It
therefore concluded that "[t]he admissibility of the contested statements, therefore,
hinges on whether the additional evidence . . . sufficiently corroborates the

statements to overcome their presumed unreliability." 131 This universal reaction to

123. Id (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 (1974)).
124. White, 116 F.3d at 914.
125. White, 116 F.3d at 914; cf Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181 (finding it unnecessary to decide
whether hearsay alone could be used to determine the admissibility of a co-conspirator statement)
126. United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Tellier, 83
F.3d 578, 580 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1181-82 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 5051 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Garbett, 867 F.2d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1402 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1343-45 (7th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Martinez, 825 F.2d 1451, 1452-53 (10th Cir. 1987); see United States v.
Byrom, 910 F.2d 725, 736 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding sufficient independent evidence to establish
involvement in a conspiracy).
127. Zambrana, 841 F.2d at 1344-45.
128. Id. at 1345; see also United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) ("In
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, however, the presumption of unreliability controls; and the
hearsay statement cannot serve as the basis for establishing the declarant's connection to the
conspiracy.").
129. United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1988).
130. Id
131. Id. at 579.
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Bourjaily was codified in 1997 by an amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence
32
801(d)(2) ("Rule 801(d)(2)").1
The corroboration requirement codified by Rule 801(d)(2) does not
directly apply to forfeiture determinations. The 1997 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence codified the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine in Rule
804(b)(6).1 3 3 The 1997 amendments also answered the question left open by
Bourjaily by amending Rule 801(d)(2) to read:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.
(2) Admission by party-opponent.-The statement is offered against a
party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a
person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The
contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone
sufficient to establish the declarant's authority under subdivision
(C), the agency or employment relationship and scope thereof under
subdivision (D), or the existence of the conspiracy and the
participation therein of the declarant and the party against whom
134
the statement is offered under subdivision (E).
The 1997 amendments therefore limit Rule 104(a) by expressly requiring
corroborative evidence as a prerequisite for admission of co-conspirator statements
and extend that requirement to statements made by authorized representatives and
agents. However, no mention is made of the simultaneously adopted forfeiture-bywrongdoing exception. 135 In addition, Advisory Committee comments regarding
Rule 804(b)(6) cite Mastrangelo,1 3 6 which held that hearsay may be used when

132. Order Amending the FED. R. EVID., 520 U.S. 1323, 1327-28 (1997); see H.R. Doc. No. 10569, supra note 21, at 18 (Committee Note). The circuits that did not expressly rule on the issue before
amendment of Rule 801(d)(2) have subsequently confirmed the need for corroborative evidence when
determining admissibility under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d
886, 894 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2013).
133. Order Amending the FED. R. EVID., 520 U.S. at 1328; see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
833 (2006) (commenting that the rule codifies the doctrine).
134. Order Amending the FED. R. EVID., 520 U.S. at 1327-28 (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. H.R. Doc. No. 105-69, supranote 21, at 22.
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making forfeiture determinations, 137 but Rule 804(b)(6) did not adopt a limitation
similar to the one added to Rule 801(d)(2). 13 8
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided, in Jenkins v.
United States, that restrictions placed upon reception of co-conspirator hearsay
need not be applied when considering forfeiture-by-wrongdoing. 139 Both hearsay
exceptions were at issue in that case. The court adhered to the restrictive Glasser
independent evidence requirement for the co-conspirator statement rule. 140 It found
no justification for extending that limitation to the forfeiture exception. 14 1 The
Jenkins court wrote that "[a]s a general proposition, a trial court is permitted to
rely on hearsay (whether or not it falls within a recognized exception) in ruling on
the admissibility of evidence, 'even where (as in this case) the question concerns
the defendant's constitutional rights.' ,142 It was not persuaded that bootstrapping
concerns mandated extension of the logic of case law regarding the co-conspirator
statement rule to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. 14 3 The court explained:
Generally speaking, it is appropriate and common for judges to consider
the substance of proffered hearsay together with independent evidence
in determining whether a hearsay exception is available; and this court
has implicitly approved such consideration in its forfeiture-bywrongdoing cases. Courts in other jurisdictions have done likewise.
There are good reasons to allow it, as discussed in Bourjaily, and we
perceive no principled reason to forbid it per se.144
The exceptions therefore do not necessarily need to be given identical treatment.
The court in Jenkins expressly noted, however, that "we are not presented with an

instance of 'pure' bootstrapping in which the testimony of the missing witness is
the only evidence supporting forfeiture, and we do not hold that such 'pure'
bootstrapping would be appropriate." 145
Reliability is an admissibility concern under both the co-conspirator
statement rule and the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Tellier directed trial courts with respect to the
co-conspirator statement rule that when making "preliminary factual
determinations under Rule 104(a), the court may consider the hearsay statements
themselves. However, these hearsay statements are presumptively unreliable, and,
for such statements to be admissible, there must be some independent

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Order Amending the FED. R. EVID., 520 U.S. at 1328.
Jenkins v. United States, 80 A.3d 978, 995-96 (D.C. 2013).
Id at 990-92.
Id at 995-96.
Id at 995 (quoting Roberson v. United States, 961 A.2d 1092, 1096 (D.C. 2008)).
Id at 996.

144. Id (footnotes omitted).

145. Id at 997 n.49.
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corroborating evidence of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy."146
Although Tellier dealt with bootstrapping under the co-conspirator statement rule,
there is no reason to believe that hearsay is any more or less reliable when used in
other contexts to determine evidence admissibility. Concerns about bootstrapping
in the Second Circuit may be logically extended to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine, because that circuit has additionally expressed interest in ensuring some
measure of reliability when confrontation forfeiture is at issue. It wrote in United
States v. Thai that trial courts should balance probative value against prejudicial
effect when admitting evidence under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule "in order
to avoid the admission of 'facially unreliable hearsay.' ,147
The Colorado Supreme Court allows hearsay to be used when making
forfeiture determinations. 148 It has, however, expressed grave concerns about pure
bootstrapping in criminal cases. The court ruled in People v. Montoya that hearsay
may be used in determining whether the prerequisites for admission of coconspirator statements have been met, but it immediately thereafter added:
We hasten to add, however, that while the alleged co-conspirator's
statement may properly be considered in resolving the issue of
admissibility, there must also be some evidence, independent of the
alleged co-conspirator's statement, establishing that the defendant and
the declarant were members of the conspiracy. Although the issue of
corroborative evidence was not answered in Bourjaily, we believe this
requirement is necessary to reduce the risk of "bootstrapping" the
evidentiary antecedents for admissibility to the level of competent
evidence. This additional requirement, in our view, will contribute some
measure of reliability both to the statement itself and to the process by
which its admissibility is determined. Without this added safeguard, the
out-of-court statement could be put to the double service of establishing
its own foundation for admissibility and thereby conceivably providing
the sole evidentiary basis for a criminal conviction.149
The Colorado Supreme Court later explained in People v. Bowers that the holding
15
in Montoya was not dictated by rule.s
Montoya therefore expresses a general
concern and arguably establishes a common law rule in Colorado that should have
application beyond the co-conspirator statement exception.
The Second Circuit and State of Colorado are not alone. The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has ruled that trial courts can rely at least

146. 83 F.3d 578, 580 (2nd Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
147. 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2nd Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2nd Cir.
1992) (holding that trial courts should perform balancing in accordance with FED. R. EVID. 403).
148. Vasquez v. People, 173 P.3d 1099, 1105 (Colo. 2007).
149. People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729, 736 (Colo. 1988) (citations omitted).
150. 801 P.2d 511, 526 n.9 (Colo. 1990).
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in part on hearsay when making forfeiture determinations. 15 1 The Sixth, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits also appear to allow its use. 15 2 However, all have additionally
expressed post-Bourjaily concerns about pure bootstrapping when making
admissibility decisions under the co-conspirator statement rule. 1 53 Illinois, New
Jersey, New York, and Ohio cases display a similar dichotomy. 15 4 The question
remains in those jurisdictions whether, and to what extent, they will extend the
reasoning from their cases regarding admissibility under the co-conspirator
statement rule to preliminary determinations under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine.
Concerns about pure bootstrapping have added significance when
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing is at issue; the Confrontation Clause "reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence. . ., but about how
reliability can best be determined[,]" namely cross-examination. 155 Crossexamination at trial is lost when forfeiture-by-wrongdoing is applied and out-ofcourt statements are admitted into evidence. 15 6 This has potential implications upon
a defendant's right to due process. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has therefore
held that trial courts "should scrutinize the proffered statements to ensure that the
evidence is not unreliable." 157 The New Jersey Supreme Court similarly ruled in

151. United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
152. See Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202-03 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618
F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979), abrogatedon other grounds by Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S.
317, 325-26 (1984), as recognized in United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976).
153. United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Beckham, 968
F.2d 47, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Garbett, 867 F.2d 1132, 1134 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Martinez, 825 F.2d 1451, 1452-53 (10th Cir. 1987).
154. Illinois allows consideration of hearsay to resolve forfeiture-by-wrongdoing questions. People
v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 353 (Ill. 2007). There must however be sufficient, substantial, and nonhearsay evidence showing the existence of a conspiracy before a co-conspirator statement is admissible
in that state. People v. Melgoza, 595 N.E.2d 1261, 1272 (Ill. App. 1992). Lower courts in New Jersey
and New York have ruled that hearsay may be used when making forfeiture determinations. State v.
Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1346-47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); People v. Perkins, 691 N.Y.S.2d
273, 274-75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); People v. Banks, 551 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1012 n.* (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989);
People v. Sweeper, 471 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487-88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). The highest courts in those states
have held that alleged co-conspirator statements cannot prove their own admissibility. State v. Clausell,
580 A.2d 221, 241 (N.J. 1990); People v. Bac Tran, 603 N.E.2d 950, 955-56 (N.Y. 1992). Ohio allows
consideration of hearsay to resolve forfeiture-by-wrongdoing questions. State v. Pickens, 25 N.E.3d
1023, 1058 ¶ 171 (Ohio 2014). It however requires the existence of a conspiracy to be proven by
independent evidence. State v. Carter, 651 N.E.2d 965, 971-72 (Ohio 1995).
155. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
156. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) ("[O]ne who obtains the absence of a witness
by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.")
157. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 n.17 (5th Cir. 1982), superseded by rule, FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v. Nelson, 242 Fed. Appx. 164, 171 (5th Cir. 2007).
Due process principles may "constitute a further bar to admission of... unreliable evidence." Michigan
v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 370 n.13 (2011) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96-97 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). Justice Harlan wrote in Californiav. Green that due process does not permit a conviction
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State v. Byrd that "[b]efore admitting an out-of-court statement of a witness under
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule, the court must determine that the statement
bears some indicia of reliability.""' It is unclear how this could be done without
some sort of corroborative evidence. The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine does
not establish the reliability of an out-of-court statement that it admits.1 59 In
addition, while Rule 104(a) authorizes use of hearsay when making admissibility
determinations, it provides no assurance that the information is trustworthy. 160
Without the added safeguard of corroborative evidence, there would be increased
risk that both the admissibility determination and ultimate verdict regarding guilt
were based on inherently unreliable evidence. 1 6 1 This seems to be at odds with the
U.S. Supreme Court's general approach to the rights of a criminal defendant. Even
when defendant misconduct is at issue, the Supreme Court cautions that "courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitutional
rights ..
162
Due process concerns persist despite provisions that relieve judges from
strict application of evidentiary rules when making preliminary admissibility
determinations. The Kentucky Supreme Court recognized in Hammond v.
Commonwealth that its version of Rule 104(a) applied to such determinations.
However, it also expressed concern that due process requires the proponent of the
hearsay to "firstpresent evidence" to establish a factual basis for application of the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. 163 It therefore held, "while we recognize that
the evidentiary hearing to determine the question of forfeiture by wrongdoing is
not governed by the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, it should go without saying that
the party with the burden of proof must present some evidence to prove the
material facts at issue."1 6 4
The California Supreme Court recognized in California v. Giles that
federal cases allow hearsay to be considered when making forfeiture
determinations, but indicated only qualified concurrence. 1 6 5 The Giles court,
based "on evidence so unreliable and untrustworthy that it may be said that the accused had been tried
by a kangaroo court." 399 U.S. 149, 186 n.20 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
158. 967 A.2d 285, 304 (N.J. 2009).
159. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (stating that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine "does not purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability.").
160. See United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1988) (writing that Rule 104(a)
does not diminish the inherent unreliability of a hearsay statement).
161. See People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729, 736 (Colo. 1988) (dealing with admissibility under the
co-conspirator statement exception to the hearsay rule).
162. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (courtroom disruption case); see also Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (recognizing the risk of witness intimidation in domestic
violence cases, but writing that "[w]e may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they
have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free.").
163. Hammond v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Parker v.
Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647, 670 (Ky. 2009)).
164. Id. at 432-33.
165. 152 P.3d 433, 446 (Cal. 2007), vacated on other grounds by Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353
(2008).
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without a full explanation of its rationale, held that "a trial court cannot make a
forfeiture finding based solely on the unavailable witness's unconfronted
testimony; there must be independent corroborative evidence that supports the
forfeiture finding."166 Giles was overruled on other grounds by the U.S. Supreme
Court,167 but its holding regarding the usability of hearsay was subsequently
reaffirmed by the California Court of Appeals.168
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals commented in United States v.
Balano "that often the only evidence of coercion will be the statement of the
coerced person, as repeated by government agents." 169 A corroboration
requirement nonetheless would not be fatal to an effective application of the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine because the need for some additional evidence
beyond the content of a hearsay statement does not pose an insurmountable
burden. The Tenth Circuit has stated with respect to the corroboration requirement
applicable to the co-conspirator statement rule that "such independent evidence
may be sufficient even though it is not 'substantial.' "170
Authorities involving the co-conspirator statement rule provide guidance
regarding the quantum and type of corroborative evidence required to avoid pure
bootstrapping. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals succinctly explained in United
States v. Clark that " '[s]ome' independent evidence is not merely a scintilla, but
rather enough to rebut the presumed unreliability of hearsay." 17 1 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Silverman noted that the proof may consist of
"evidence short of proof of the commission of a substantive offense . . . .172It
nonetheless must be "fairly incriminating," and "[e]vidence of wholly innocuous
conduct or statements by the defendant will rarely be sufficiently
corroborative . . . .,,173 "It is permissible, however, for a court to consider the
corroborating evidence 'in light of the co-conspirator's statement itself' ,174
Therefore, a court is not required to wear blinders when assessing whether
sufficient corroborating evidence exists. The hearsay itself may be considered
when determining if other evidence is incriminating or innocuous. "[I]ndividual
pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation

166. Id.
167. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 355-73, 376-77.
168. People v. Osorio, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 167, 173 (Cal. App. 2008).
169. 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other grounds by Richardson v. United
States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1984), as recognized in United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815 (10th
Cir. 2000)
170. United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Rascon, 8 F.3d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir.1993)).
171. 18 F.3d 1337, 1342 (6th Cir. 1994).
172. 861 F.2d 571, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).
173. Id. at 578.
174. United States v. Miller, 981 F.2d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Silverman, 861 F.2d at
578).
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prove it. The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its
constituent parts."1 75

Clark, Silverman, and other circuit court cases decided in the wake of
Bourjaily were considered by the Advisory Committee when it recommended
addition of a corroboration requirement to Rule 801(d)(2).1 76 Committee
commentary is instructive regarding the types of proof that may satisfactorily
corroborate a hearsay statement:
The court
statement,
statement
statement

must consider in addition the circumstances surrounding the
such as the identity of the speaker, the context in which the
was made, or evidence corroborating the contents of the
in making its determination as to each preliminary

.177

question.

The circumstances surrounding the utterance of the hearsay may therefore be
sufficient. 1 78 This type of proof may actually be more probative than confirmatory
evidence to rebut a hearsay statement's presumed unreliability. 1 7 9
Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to satisfy the corroborative
evidence requirement under the co-conspirator statement rule.180 This is consistent
with cases involving the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine which have held that
witness tampering may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.8
The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained in United States v. Scott:
It seems almost certain that, in a case involving coercion or threats, a
witness who refuses to testify at trial will not testify to the actions

&

175. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1987); see Geraci v. Senkowski, 23
F.Supp.2d 246, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Standing alone, such conduct may be innocuous, but a factfinder
is not required to view it in isolation."), aff'd, 211 F.3d 6 (2d Cir. 2000).
176. H.R. Doc. No. 105-69, supra note 21, at 18.
177. Id.
178. Cf State v. Byrd, 967 A.2d 285, 304 (N.J. 2009) (holding that a statement is admissible under
the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule if "its reliability has been established by a preponderance of the
evidence in light of all surrounding relevant circumstances.") (quoting State v. Gross, 577 A.2d 814,
820 (N.J. 1990)).
179. Cf Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137-38 (1999) (stating that the Supreme Court had
"squarely rejected the notion that 'evidence corroborating the truth of a hearsay statement may properly
support a finding that the statement bears "particular guarantees of trustworthiness." ' "); Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819-23 (1990) (explaining that the exceptions to the hearsay rule rely on context
and the circumstances in which certain types of statements are made to assure truthfulness and later
doubting whether the confirmatory type of corroborating evidence provides any basis to presume that a
hearsay statement is trustworthy).
180. United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 337 (6th Cir. 2009); see also United States v.
Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1346-47 (7th Cir. 1988).
181. United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666, 671 (2nd Cir. 2007); see generally Tim Donaldson
Karen Olson, Classic Abusive Relationships and the Inference of Witness Tampering in Family
Violence Cases after Giles v. California, 36 LINcOLN L. REV. 45, 75-79 (2008-09) (reviewing cases
approving reliance upon circumstantial evidence to prove forfeiture).
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procuring his or her unavailability. It would not serve the goal of Rule
804(b)(6) to hold that circumstantial evidence cannot support a finding
of coercion. Were we to hold otherwise, defendants would have a
perverse incentive to cover up wrongdoing with still more wrongdoing,
182
to the loss of probative evidence at trial.

In those instances, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is not a disfavored form of proof
and, in fact, may be stronger than direct evidence when it depends upon
'undisputed evidentiary facts about which human observers are less likely to
err . . or to distort.' "183 Circumstantial evidence should therefore also be adequate
to satisfy any corroborative proof requirement that might be engrafted to Rule
104(a) with respect to admissibility determinations under the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is a "prophylactic rule to deal with
abhorrent behavior 'which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself' ,184
Forfeiture is a preliminary question involving the admissibility of evidence, and it
would therefore normally be governed by Rule 104(a), and similar state
evidentiary rules, which provide that the exclusionary rules, other than privileges,
do not apply to such determinations.ss A majority of lower courts have therefore
18 6
held that hearsay may be used to prove forfeiture-by-wrongdoing.
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that its version of Rule
104(a) gives trial courts the ability to disregard evidentiary rules when making
admissibility determinations, but it has explained that the real question is whether
that power should be exercised.1 8 7 The Utah Supreme Court has determined that
the right of confrontation is too important to let questions regarding its forfeiture to
be based on inadmissible evidence, and state courts in Utah therefore can rest
forfeiture decisions only upon proof admissible under evidentiary rules. 8 The
Utah rule aligns that state with authority originating from Glasser v. United States
where the U.S. Supreme Court expressed concern before Rule 104(a) was adopted
about hearsay lifting "itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent
evidence."1 8 9

182. United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Jonassen,
759 F.3d 653, 662 (7th Cir. 2014).
183. People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 823 (N.Y. 1995).
184. H.R. Doc. No. 105-69, supra note 21, at 22 (Committee Note) (quoting United States v.
Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2nd Cir. 1982)).
185. See Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273; State v. Pickens, 25 N.E.3d 1023, 1058 ¶ 171 (Ohio 2014).
186. See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
187. State v. Poole, 232 P.3d 519, 527 (Utah 2010).

188. Id.
189. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1941).
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia wrote in Jenkins v.
United States that it is not persuaded that bootstrapping concerns mandate
extension of the logic adopted by Glasser and like cases to the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine.1 9 0 Courts elsewhere have correctly observed that successful
witness tampering would often not be provable if hearsay could not be used.19 1 The
court in Jenkins reasoned that there is "no principled reason to forbid it per se." 192
That court nonetheless noted that it was not holding that " 'pure' bootstrapping
would be appropriate."193
A judge can bring considerable experience and knowledge to bear on the
issue of how much weight to give hearsay, and the practicalities of criminal trials
demand that the judge have discretion to consider its content when making a
preliminary determination regarding its admissibility. 1 9 4 Hearsay is "only
presumed unreliable."1 9 5 It has probative value, and the presumption "may be
rebutted by appropriate proof" 196
Witness tampering is difficult to prove. Witnesses too scared to testify are
unlikely to testify as to why they are scared. 197 Despite this difficulty, trial courts
should scrutinize hearsay statements when applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine to make sure that they are reliable. 198 Rule 104(a) does not by itself
guarantee the reliability of a hearsay statement when used to help establish its own
admissibility. 199 The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine also does not itself
determine reliability.2 0 0 Without the added safeguard of corroborative evidence,
there is a risk in instances of pure bootstrapping that an "out-of-court statement
could be put to the double service of establishing its own foundation for
admissibility and thereby conceivably providing the sole evidentiary basis for a
criminal conviction." 2 0 1 Trial courts should therefore be allowed to consider
hearsay when making admissibility determinations under the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine, but at least some corroborative evidence should also be
required.

190. See Jenkins, 80 A.3d at 996 (citing Butler v. United States, 481 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1984)). Butler
adhered to Glasser. Butler v. United States, 481 A.2d 431, 439-40 (D.C. 1984).
191. Geraci v. Senkowski, 23 F.Supp.2d 246, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd 211 F.3d 6 (2d Cir.
2000); see also United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other
grounds by Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1984), as recognized in United States v.
Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 815 (10th Cir. 2000).
192. 80 A.3d 978, 996 (D.C. 2013).
193. Id at 997 n.49.
194. United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
195. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179 (1987).
196. Id
197. United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002).
198. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633 n.17 (5th Cir. 1982), superseded by rule, FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(6), as recognized in United States v. Nelson, 242 Fed. Appx. 164, 171 (5th Cir. 2007).
199. United States v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1988).
200. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
201. People v. Montoya, 753 P.2d 729, 736 (Colo. 1988).
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